This presentation is part of: F30-2 Microeconomic Aspects of Monetary Integration

Monetary Integration and Postal Services

Maciej Lewandowski, Ph.D., Polish Post, Baluckiego 30/30, Krakow, 30 – 318, Poland

The main objective of the paper is to present all potential and actual threats and opportunities that result from monetary integration in Europe for postal services rendered by national post operators. The problem is of no common nature since the national post operators are subject to many regulations and requirements that make the business environment far from perfect competition. This is associated with many benefits, including legal monopoly in many areas. The EU policy however is heading toward sequential liberalization of postal services market that will be achieved in the coming years. This means that national post operators will be subject to external competition from other EU member states. They are already competing with some international commercial logistics/courier services companies but there is going to be a substantial change in the severity of competition on this market, as long as the national post operators do not create an oligopoly to set prices or market shares.

The paper develops a formal theoretical framework to show how an oligopoly in EMU can efficiently substitute the monopoly on national postal services markets found today. The stylized fact advocated by the Author is that monetary integration facilitates oligopoly structure rather than any other market structures to substitute for the legal monopoly found today in the postal industry. Despite of a hypothesis that removing the last barriers for economic integration by introducing a common currency facilitates monopolization, the specific features postal services undermine it. Therefore the paper is offering an alternative that could apply for some other industries that are also subject to some specific regulations. This refers especially to sectors that were historically public but that have been undergoing restructuring and privatization in the EU that strives for liberalization of certain business activities.

Since the paper is of fully theoretical nature, there are no data sets used in any quantitative analysis. The methods employed cover modeling consumer and firm choice in a monopoly/oligopoly model with some modifications to reflect the EU specific features and the EMU consequences for postal services providers.

The expected results are as follows: 1) controlling for the EMU specific features oligopoly structure for postal services market should represent the only efficient solution satisfying boundary conditions at national and regional levels, 2) benefits/costs for postal services providers and consumers should be revealed.

 

 JEL Classification: D21, E42, F33.

 Keywords: postal economics, monetary integration.