70th International Atlantic Economic Conference

October 11 - 13, 2010 | Charleston, USA

Primary Voting Systems and Economic Freedom: An Analysis of U.S. States

Monday, October 11, 2010: 8:30 AM
Peter Calcagno, Ph.D. , Economics and Finance, College of Charleston, Charleston, SC
Economists have long argued that institutions matter for economically efficiency and to generate economic growth.  One institution of interest is a state's primary electoral system. Currently, in the United States there are five different primary voting systems used to select candidates to represent a political party in the general election. In June 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned California's Open Primary Act. Opposing parties argued that allowing nonparty members to choose their party's nominees violated their rights to political association. The literature suggests that more extreme candidates emerge from a closed primary system. In addition, it has been found that open primaries lead to higher voter turnout in the general election. The question of strategic voting emerges as primaries become more open, and was a central issue in the U.S. Supreme Court Case. The question I propose to examine is whether a closed primary system is an institutional arrangement that is consistent with economic freedom, or one that restricts it. Using a two stage technique an ordered probit model I can test if economic freedom explains whether a state is more likely to operate a closed or blanket primary system