70th International Atlantic Economic Conference

October 11 - 13, 2010 | Charleston, USA

Allocating Infection: The Political Economy of the Swine Flu Vaccine

Monday, October 11, 2010: 9:30 AM
Matt E. Ryan, Ph.D. , Economics, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA
Previous research has isolated the effect of “congressional dominance” in explaining bureaucracy-related outcomes.  This analysis extends the concept of congressional dominance to the allocation of H1N1, or swine flu, vaccine doses.  States with Democratic United States Representatives on the relevant House oversight committee received roughly 60,000 additional doses per legislator during the initial allocation period, though this political advantage dissipated after the first three weeks of vaccine distribution.  At-risk groups identified by the CDC, such as younger age groups and first responders, do not receive more vaccine doses, and in fact receive slightly fewer units of vaccine.