The model assumes an annual labor contract that accounts for the benefits and costs of absenteeism perceived by both the employer and the employees. The utility of the typical employee is assumed to be a function of wage income, sick pay, the value of time away from work, and the intrinsic rewards from work effort. And assuming perfect competition, the employer’s total revenue will be fully absorbed by the cost of capital, total wage costs, sick pay, and the additional costs created by absent workers. The model therefore implies that the utility maximizing contract for employees will be consistent with the profit maximizing outcome for the employer, and the solution of the model is expected to generate conditions for the equilibrium levels of employment, the number of employees working, and hence, the number of absences over the contract period.
The implications of the model will be interpreted to clarify that for competitive firms the total costs typically associated with absenteeism do not accurately indicate the economic losses created by unplanned absenteeism; costs of unplanned absenteeism that are based upon accounting and employment data and do not account for the firm’s economic environment are typically overstated. Accordingly, the model will imply a framework for arriving at a better understanding of the real costs of absenteeism. Moreover, with greater understanding of mechanisms that lead to the equilibrium absence rates, the model will generate implications that will allow us to identify more effective strategies for employers in their efforts to manage absenteeism.