72nd International Atlantic Economic Conference

October 20 - 23, 2011 | Washington, USA

Asymmetric information in oil and gas lease auctions with a national company

Friday, 21 October 2011: 4:35 PM
Marcelo Rezende, Ph.D. , Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC
Rafael Matoso, M.A. , Petrobras S.A., Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
In this paper we test predictions from one of the most important models of auction theory with asymmetric information using new data from oil and gas tract auctions in Brazil. The predictions are based on the noncooperative first-price, sealed bid model with asymmetric information studied by Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber (1983) and Hendricks and Porter (1988). In this model, one bidder is assumed to be better informed about tract value than its competitors, and we assume in our setting that such position is held by Petrobras, the Brazilian national oil company, which was a monopolist for more than 40 years, currently leads the national market in reserves and production and was the main winner in these auctions. Based on this assumption, we use the model to predict how Petrobras and its competitors should bid in equilibrium. We test the predictions on the 3,571 auctions for oil and gas tracts conducted in ten annual rounds from 1999 to 2008.

We show that the data strongly support the model’s predictions about bidding behavior. Petrobras’ bids should have been highly correlated with profitability, while its competitors’ should not. Thus, notification of hydrocarbons should be positively correlated with Petrobras’s valuation of tracts and orthogonal to its competitors’. Indeed, Petrobras notified that it found hydrocarbons in 95 out of the 403 tracts that it won, which is almost 50 percent higher than the same ratio for its competitors, equal to 63 out of 400. Moreover, the ratio between Petrobras’ average winning bid for tracts where hydrocarbons were eventually detected and the average of all its winning bids is larger than the same ratio for its competitors.

We also test a prediction that explores the fact that we observe many tracts being offered repeatedly. We start from the observation that if Petrobras held superior information that contained any knowledge its competitors might have, then any information that the latter might have revealed through their bids in previous auctions should not affect how Petrobras bid in future auctions for the same tract. On the other hand, Petrobras’ bid in an auction should have affected its competitors’ bids in future auctions for the same tract because the latter’s bid contained some of its private information about the tract’s value that should have caused its competitors to adjust their own estimates of it. Because these repeated tracts had been offered in a past round, received no bids and were offered again later, this reasoning predicts that Petrobras should have valued tracts that had been offered before relatively more than its competitors. Bidders’ participation decisions support our prediction about how bids relate to whether a tract had been offered before. For both onshore and offshore tracts, the ratio between auctions for tracts that were never offered that received bids from Petrobras and from its competitors is lower than for tracts that had been offered before, which indicates that Petrobras valued tracts that had been offered before as opposed to tracts that had never been offered relatively more than its competitors.