In this paper a theory of planning horizons is introduced to raise some meaningful questions about the traditional view with respect to its substitution, decreasing returns and independence assumptions. Suppositions of complementarity, increasing returns and interdependence suggest that competition is inefficient in network economies by upholding and reinforcing a myopic culture resistant to learning. Growth – though long believed to rise from markets and competitive values – may not derive from these sources. Instead, as civilizations advance, shifting from material wants to higher-order intangible output in the sense of Abraham Maslow, they evolve from market tradeoffs (substitution and scarcity) into realms of common need (complementarity and abundance). If so, then neoclassical arguments shall no longer apply to any advanced information network (knowledge) economy also restrained by ecological systemic complementarities.
The paper opens standard theory into a more general framework casting ‘horizon effects’ into a case for cooperation as more efficient than competition for all long-term problems of growth. The claim is made that competition is spawning a myopic culture at the expense of learning and trust, therefore retarding economic growth instead of advancing it as believed. The policy implications of horizonal theory are explored, with respect to regulatory aims and economic concerns. Such an approach emphasizes strict constraints against entry barriers, ecological harm, market power abuse and ethical lapses. Social cohesion – not competition – is sought as a means to extend horizons and thereby increase efficiency, equity and ecological health. The overriding importance of horizon effects for regulatory assessment dominates other orthodox standards in economics and law. Reframing economics along horizonal lines suggests some meaningful insight on the proper design of economic systems.