The economics of crime: The counterintuitive case of the stolen base

Traditionally, economists predict that when the police force is more effective, a potential criminal is less likely to commit a crime.  This standard approach is a one player optimization problem.  This paper considers the influence of more effective policing in a two player game between: 1) a criminal and 2) a player who spends effort to police against the crime himself, but would like to avoid expending this effort.  The model predicts that when the policing agent is more proficient: 1) the police exert less effort, and 2) the criminal does not change his behavior.     

            This model is applied to Major League Baseball.  In this analogy, the runner on first base commits a crime if he steals second base.  The policing effort by the pitcher is his pick-off throw to first base.  The pitcher’s arm tires if he throws to either first base or to home plate, so the pitcher would like to avoid throwing to first base.  A left handed pitcher is more proficient at throwing to first base than a right handed pitcher -- because the left hander can make a quicker throw to first base.  Normally, one would expect that a more proficient input would be used more often.  Our game theory model predicts that the left hander will throw to first base less often.  This prediction is tested using data from Major League Baseball.