The first section of the paper considers the major "similarities" that exist between the two polar regions. These similarities lend suppport to the argument that the present Antarctic governance system can be applied as a useful benchmark for effective Arctic governance. The second section, in turn, considers the major "differences" that exist between the two polar rgions. These diffeences lend support to the argument that the Antarctic Treaty Sstem has little to offer as a model for Arctic supranational governance. The third and final section of the paper assimilates these "similarities" and "differences" into a composite arrangement leading to a politico-economic analysis and conclusions regarding the relevance of the Antarctic Treaty System as a possible governance model for the Arctic region. Three possible outcomes are considered, namely, high relevance, low relevance, or an intermediate use of selective aspects of the Antarctic governance model for Arctic governance.
The methodology of the paper utilizes the analytical tools of public economics with an interface to international law. Its focus is micreeconomic. The paper does not employ an empirical model, but does draw upon economic data to support its analytical argumentation.