Trust and reciprocity among former child soldiers: An experimental approach
This project takes an experimental approach to understanding trust and reciprocity among former child soldiers in Liberia with the goal of informing reintegration efforts. Most prior studies of the economic impacts of child soldiering use anecdotal or case study approaches rather than scientific or statistical analysis, and none have used experiments., This experiment seeks to answer the question: Does former child soldiers' trust/reciprocity behavior differ from that of others?
Methods
The experiment was conducted in January and February 2014 in Saclepea, Liberia. Saclepea was a training ground for child soldiers during Liberia’s civil wars, and effects of child soldiering are still felt today. Participants included 240 men ages 22 to 35, some of whom had been child soldiers and some of whom had no direct involvement in the Liberian war. Subjects played the standard investment game introduced by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) and developed more fully by Cox (2004). Experimental results were supplemented with individual surveys about soldiering experiences and post-war outcomes.
Expected Results
Based on literature that shows worse economic outcomes for former child soldiers and literature that indicates lack of trust may be a common characteristic among former child soldiers, the following results are predicted for this experiment. 1) Former child soldiers will exhibit less trusting behavior (pass less from their endowments) than non-soldiers. And 2) Former child soldiers will exhibit less reciprocal behavior (return less of what is passed to them) than non-soldiers.
The results will provide an indication of the degree to which the experience of child soldering has impacted willingness to trust and reciprocate, both important elements in the formation of contracts and social capital generally.