Natural disaster, policy action, and mental well-being: The case of Fukushima

Tuesday, 14 October 2014: 4:30 PM
Christian Krekel, MSc , German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Berlin, Germany
Seemingly the worst-case scenario, on March 11, 2011, a natural disaster triggered one of the worst nuclear catastrophes in human history: the Fukushima catastrophe. At about 3pm JST, the Tohoku earthquake, magnitude 9.0, struck off the east coast of Japan at an underwater depth of about 19 miles. Never before had such a powerful earthquake hit Japan. It triggered a gigantic tsunami with waves up to 133 feet. The tsunami’s dimensions by far exceeded the safety measures of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant whose 19 feet sea walls were easily topped by the up to 49 feet tsunami waves hitting the shore. Although the safety measures met regulatory requirements, 3 of the 6 reactors fully melted down, leading to the second worst nuclear disaster after Chernobyl in the history of the civil use of nuclear power.

We study the impact of the Fukushima disaster on mental well-being in Germany - another industrialized country which is more than 5,000 miles distant and therewith not directly affected by the disaster. We find that meltdown significantly increased environmental concerns by 20% among the German population. Subsequent drastic policy action by the conservative government in Germany permanently shut down the oldest nuclear reactors, implemented the phase-out of the remaining ones, and proclaimed the transition to renewables. This energy policy turnaround is largely supported by the population and equalized the increase in mental distress. We estimate that during the 3 months after the meltdown, Fukushima triggered external monetized health costs worth €250 per distressed citizen.

This research shows that (1) disasters do not only have local negative effects, but also impose external negative effects on other countries even if these countries are far away and therewith not directly affected by the disaster; (2) such external negative effects exist even if a disaster in country A does not increase the objective risk of a similar disaster in country B; and (3) immediate and credible policy action can remediate such external negative effects.