Morbidity risk and health-insurance coverage
The Brazilian institutional context is relatively standard. A regulatory reform approved in 1998 restricted risk-based premiums such that they depend exclusively on seven pre-determined age categories. Our data allows us to divide health-insurance contracts in two groups: (i) the individual policies, which are paid by the insuree directly to the carrier; and (ii) the employer-contracted policies, which are contracted through an employer. In principle, adverse selection should act more intensively in individual policies than in employer-contracted plans, since the choice of the latter type of policy depends on many other factors besides ex-ante individual risk. On the other hand, morbidity risk caused by moral hazard should affect both types of policies equally, given that they present the same coverage level and, then, the same incentive structure. We estimate the risk-coverage relationship for each of those pre-determined age categories. Contrary to previous results from other countries, we do not find a positive correlation between self-reported morbidity and insurance coverage.