Reconstructing the World Trade Organization: A supply-chain chapter
The WTO, which had served to unify trade policy rules and negotiations on the most-favored nation (MFN) principle, finds itself unable to take up this issue, due to the limitations of its institutional structures inherited from the GATT. The WTO’s emphasis on negotiating border measures on product-by-product categories and policy areas has made it incapable of negotiating cross-cutting clusters of behind-the-border policies and regulations. In addition, services and foreign direct investment agreements that go beyond WTO coverage are typically bundled into supply chain agreements. Finally, investor protection and ISDS provisions, in which private companies have standing in disputes, go beyond what WTO agreements currently allow.
The proposed paper will establish a conceptual framework for a new version of the WTO that can accommodate supply chain trade rules, negotiations and dispute settlement. Various pathways, such as multilateralized and accession-based PTAs, as well as WTO annex 4 (pleurilateral) agreements, will be considered. The methodology will draw on the institutional economics literature, as well as insights of trade policy economists such as Baldwin (2014). Some descriptive data may also be used.
Works Cited
Searle, John (1995). The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press.
Baldwin, Richard (2014). WTO 2.0: Global governance of supply-chain trade. Review of International Organizations, vol. 5 (2).