Gordon Tullock’s Non-Conventional Contributions to Economics
Tullock’s insights have so revolutionized the way economists and political scientists think that his work may seem unremarkable today. As co-founder of Public Choice, Tullock made seminal contributions to the economic theory of majority voting, constitutions, rent seeking, fiscal federalism, bureaucracy, government action to redistribute income, demand revelation, bio-economics, monetary history, and in law with focus on the economic analysis of pollution, crime, punishment, and litigation.
The paper uses a Public Choice framework to explore a sample of Tullock's little known work prior to and after his formal association with Buchanan. The papers reviewed in this paper include papers on managing the commons (fisheries on the high seas), cognitive dissonance (charitable giving), constitutions, monetary theory and policy, and legal and public affairs commentaries as "op eds" (written while at the University of South Carolina). The topics range from tests of statistical significance in publication decisions to Korea and political economy issues. Our paper surveys Tullock’s unconventional work within the broader context of his contributions to the development of Public Choice.