Strategies reinforcing corruption contracts

The paper deals with some issues connected with corruption. First it shortly summarizes negative consequences of corruptions and it emphasizes that the harmful nature of the corruption risks is not solely confined to the economic area. Other damage is equally serious in particular, especially the fact that corruption creates an unequal position. Due to corruption, people are preferred according to their willingness and ability to corrupt, according to their involvement in the corruption system or similar criteria (e.g. kinship). Corruption limits equality of opportunities, limits the state where every person can freely pursue his or her goals. In many cases, the objective can only be achieved through corrupt conduct. General capabilities are less critical, the ability to corrupt is more important. The article further analyzes how to reduce risk connected with the corruption contract. Standard scientific approaches can be described as “from a regular (legal) contract to a corruption contract”. Our finding is the opposite. We describe a mechanism how a corruption contract can lead to long-run relationships where corruption is only one part of the relationship. Mutual blackmail, mutual coverage and mutual favor are examples of others. Thus we call a structure that such relationships create a “structure based on mutual coverage general acceptable principles”. The structure is connected with the phenomenon of positional good (positional investing) and members of the structure share a “basic ideological paradigm”or common conviction regarding right and wrong. The article analyzes characteristic features of the structures and environment that help a structure to achieve its aims.