Despite having reached consolidated democratic status at the end of the 20^th century, during the last decade some Latin American countries experienced transitions to regimes with uncertain levels of democracy. What explains these apparent recoils in the opposite direction? This paper examines the economic linkages to the changes in governance and political legitimacy in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. Many controversies surround the Chávez, Morales and Correa regimes. Their supporters claim that their governments are creative experiments of radical and participatory democracy. In sharp contrast, critics argue that these regimes represent a new form of authoritarianism, combining elements of populism, nationalism, and political hierarchy. How should one assess these regimes? Did they sway towards covered dictatorships or did they resemble a new form of emancipatory democracy? This paper seeks answers for these contradictory puzzles by addressing two research questions. One, did Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador experience a turn from democracy to autocracy in the period 2000-2015? Two, if that was the case, what explains this variation in their governance and resulting de-democratization processes?

To answer these questions the paper takes two systematic analytical approaches, incorporating a mix of quantitative and qualitative methodologies (before and after; multivariate regression and comparative case analysis). First, to determine the occurrence and degree of the changes in governance, the three regimes’ institutional features are compared to previous historical periods and to theoretical yardsticks of democracy and authoritarianism. Second, to find explanations to these changes, we explore the argument that distinctive economic, social, political, institutional, and cultural factors crucially shape the transition from democracies to authoritarian regimes. Employing a multivariate regression for each of the cases, the paper examines five independent variables: poverty and inequality; fluctuations in the price of resources (oil/coca leaf); institutional presence; political inclusion and characteristics of the leader, analyzing their effect over the dependent variable (level of governance). Last, comparative case analysis is deployed, searching for similar or different patterns between the three regimes.

Empirical analysis of the 2000-2015 period leads to the conclusion that economic and institutional factors have the strongest explanatory power and are ultimately fundamental in determining variations in the level of governance and de-democratization processes.

Key Words: democracy; poverty; inequality; institutions; de-democratization; authoritarianism