Saturday, 27 March 2010: 11:35
Property rights are in the center of fisheries management difficulties. The problem becomes more complex when fisheries are transboundary by nature.
Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction gave the coastal states property rights and the potential of a sustainable management of fisheries resources. However, the Law of the Sea doesn’t exclude the “freedom of the seas”- the High Sea remains with a statute where the principle of free access is in force.
The problems of “unfinished business” of UNCLOS (1982), that is, the imprecise definition of use rights in the areas of High Seas adjacent to the EEZs and the consequent difficulties in the management of the straddling stocks, made the origins of several “fish wars”, in the 90s.
The U. N. Agreement (1995) on Transboundary Stocks and Highly Migratory Species pretended to be a formula of cooperation among interested states. Curiously, in the European Union, USA and Canada it was well received, but in Portugal it was seen with reserves.
Despite some interesting results, this Agreement continues to be the motive of discussion, especially in the context of NAFO. Facing the poor results in restoring the cod stocks, the leaders of Newfoundland fisheries organizations have been proposing the enlargement of jurisdiction over the High Seas areas adjacent of the Canadian EEZ.
The discussion around the enlargement of EEZs and a certain rehabilitation of the juridical and economical statute of the Continental Platform come to bring a new impulse to the debate. The United Nations recognise that the limit of the 200 miles doesn't make any biological sense. The statute of EEZ is much more of functional type. But the Continental Platform has a geomorphologic unquestionable existence. The coastal countries consider it an extension of their territory. For some policy makers a new extension of EEZ would be a logical step in the process that took the establishment of EEZs, recognising that it was not enough to assure the necessary conservation of the stocks. To extend EEZ for the waters above the continental platform would be in agreement with the rules that govern the bed of the Platform. These rights belong to the coastal State of whose terrestrial mass the Platform is the natural extension.
In recent times, the Portuguese Governments assured that a fundamental objective of the marine policy should be the exploitation of the Platform. Perhaps, that is not a prudent declaration. These appeals, in the media, could be interpreted, by other States, as a position of agreement with EEZ extension. In the context of Portuguese fisheries, extension of EEZs would have undesirable effects. Portugal would loose fishing opportunities for long distance fleet, without granting additional benefits or resources, given the closeness of our Platform.
The aim of the paper is to discuss (by using Game Theory) the possible efficiency gains arising from the 95-Agreement and to investigate this fracture in decision makers opinions, making the repertory of related issues, critics and doubts. And, of course, to discuss the Portuguese position in this debate.
Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction gave the coastal states property rights and the potential of a sustainable management of fisheries resources. However, the Law of the Sea doesn’t exclude the “freedom of the seas”- the High Sea remains with a statute where the principle of free access is in force.
The problems of “unfinished business” of UNCLOS (1982), that is, the imprecise definition of use rights in the areas of High Seas adjacent to the EEZs and the consequent difficulties in the management of the straddling stocks, made the origins of several “fish wars”, in the 90s.
The U. N. Agreement (1995) on Transboundary Stocks and Highly Migratory Species pretended to be a formula of cooperation among interested states. Curiously, in the European Union, USA and Canada it was well received, but in Portugal it was seen with reserves.
Despite some interesting results, this Agreement continues to be the motive of discussion, especially in the context of NAFO. Facing the poor results in restoring the cod stocks, the leaders of Newfoundland fisheries organizations have been proposing the enlargement of jurisdiction over the High Seas areas adjacent of the Canadian EEZ.
The discussion around the enlargement of EEZs and a certain rehabilitation of the juridical and economical statute of the Continental Platform come to bring a new impulse to the debate. The United Nations recognise that the limit of the 200 miles doesn't make any biological sense. The statute of EEZ is much more of functional type. But the Continental Platform has a geomorphologic unquestionable existence. The coastal countries consider it an extension of their territory. For some policy makers a new extension of EEZ would be a logical step in the process that took the establishment of EEZs, recognising that it was not enough to assure the necessary conservation of the stocks. To extend EEZ for the waters above the continental platform would be in agreement with the rules that govern the bed of the Platform. These rights belong to the coastal State of whose terrestrial mass the Platform is the natural extension.
In recent times, the Portuguese Governments assured that a fundamental objective of the marine policy should be the exploitation of the Platform. Perhaps, that is not a prudent declaration. These appeals, in the media, could be interpreted, by other States, as a position of agreement with EEZ extension. In the context of Portuguese fisheries, extension of EEZs would have undesirable effects. Portugal would loose fishing opportunities for long distance fleet, without granting additional benefits or resources, given the closeness of our Platform.
The aim of the paper is to discuss (by using Game Theory) the possible efficiency gains arising from the 95-Agreement and to investigate this fracture in decision makers opinions, making the repertory of related issues, critics and doubts. And, of course, to discuss the Portuguese position in this debate.