Friday, 26 March 2010: 16:45
This paper uses spatial econometrics to explore both vertical and horizontal tax competition over mobile capital by considering state-level and local-level capital taxes in the U.S. for the period 2000-2006. The empirical application is unique in its focus on multiple federations and allowance for intra-federation competition and inter-federation competition. The models accommodate horizontal competition across (aggregate) local governments and across individual states, vertical competition between local governments and their own state, and vertical competition between own-state local governments and other states.
We consider the corporate income and franchise taxes, as well as state property taxes, as the primary taxes on mobile capital at the state level. At the local level we focus on the business share of the property tax. We find that within-federation vertical reaction functions are negative for both states and their localities indicating that state and local government capital tax rates are strategic substitutes. The results reveal negative state and local capital tax reaction functions, a finding that is robust to alternative specifications of the model. The estimated local reaction functions are steeper than their state counterparts, perhaps a reflection of greater concerns over tax base flight and service delivery capacity. Inter-jurisdictional competition takes a very different form. Local tax rates react positively to both other-state capital tax rates and to the tax rates of localities in other states. State tax rates, on the other hand, are not affected by the tax rates of localities in other states, but they do react positively to the tax rates of neighboring states. This result may reflect a yardstick effect whereby other-state rates are more visible than local tax rates in other states.
We consider the corporate income and franchise taxes, as well as state property taxes, as the primary taxes on mobile capital at the state level. At the local level we focus on the business share of the property tax. We find that within-federation vertical reaction functions are negative for both states and their localities indicating that state and local government capital tax rates are strategic substitutes. The results reveal negative state and local capital tax reaction functions, a finding that is robust to alternative specifications of the model. The estimated local reaction functions are steeper than their state counterparts, perhaps a reflection of greater concerns over tax base flight and service delivery capacity. Inter-jurisdictional competition takes a very different form. Local tax rates react positively to both other-state capital tax rates and to the tax rates of localities in other states. State tax rates, on the other hand, are not affected by the tax rates of localities in other states, but they do react positively to the tax rates of neighboring states. This result may reflect a yardstick effect whereby other-state rates are more visible than local tax rates in other states.