General principle of corruption networks

A corruption contract differs from other ones: it is hidden, non-enforceable and it does not end with its execution. Differences are connected with higher risk. Theory usually expects the parties of a corruption contract to try to reduce risk by establishing long-term stable relationships before the contract starts. Our analysis takes the opposite approach: a corruption contract can create long-term and stable relationships and affinity even among parties with weak social ties. The establishment of these relationships is analyzed through model “tragedy of commons”. If somebody catches another person violating generally accepted principles, he/she can start blackmailing the person and force them to break the norms in other ways. On the other hand both persons can favor each other. Such an environment creates incentives for corruption and for other illegal activities. People participating in illegal activities form so-called structures based on mutual covering-up of violations of generally accepted principles. The article analyses the structures in comparison with Mafia or other organized crime groups.  The characteristics and the main feature of the structure are given. Also discussed is how the structures affect the rest of the society when they exist.  The tools of game theory and in part the theory of redistribution systems and parallel redistribution games are used for describing and valuating affinities among members of a structure. It is shown how the value of affinity can overweight advantages coming from not violating the principles and how affinity prevents people outside a structure from offering a convenient deal to the members of the structure.