Giuseppe Eusepi, Ph., D., Public Economics, Sapienza University of Rome, Via del Castro Laurenziano, 9, Rome, 00161, Italy, Rosario Gómez-Alvarez Díaz, Ph., D., Department of History and Economics Institutions and Applied Economics, University of Seville, Ramón y Cajal, nº 1, Seville, 41018, Spain, and Luís Angel Hierro Recio, Ph., D., History and Economics Institutions and Applied Economics, University of Seville, Ramón y Cajal, nº 1, Seville, 41018, Spain.
After reviewing the different types of federalism, we try to discern a fundamental tension between genuine forms of federalism – which are those built following a bottom-up logic and which are based on a fiscal constitution – and spurious forms of federalism, which are basically mere forms of decentralization inspired by a benevolent dictator paradigm. The Spanish version of federalism for some aspects fits into the first category, for others into the second. In an effort to support this view, the paper seeks to:
(1) Analyze federal policies couched in the logic of a fiscal constitution as represented by the Budget Stability Law, which has forced Spanish regions to eliminate their deficits;
(2) Highlight how both central government and Autonomous Communities, by changing the criteria for allocating transfers every five years, have cut their coat according to the cloth of political interests.